T he European Community's (EC's) agricultural policy is, paradoxically, its crowning achievement and its Achilles' heel. By almost any physical measure it has been eminently successful: over the past two decades output has grown at more than 3 percent a year and exports by more than double that rate. Yet the increasing expenditures needed to support farm prices (approximately 27.5 billion European currency units [ECUs] in 1988) have alienated European consumers and provoked trading partners, whereas the farmers
themselves have criticized the expenditures as inadequate and inequitably distributed.
As the EC has become more self-sufficient in agriculture it has shifted from importing to exporting many agricultural commodities. Displaced former exporters to the EC, now competing in third markets with subsidized EC exports, have become increasingly unhappy with the effect of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on commercial agricultural trade. The ensuing complaintsparticularly of the temperate-product exporters, led by the United States-have multiplied as the effects of the CAP on the food production systems, agricultural prices, and rural development of developing countries have made themselves felt.
These wider repercussions of the CAP, with their important implications for planners, policymakers, and economists working on agriculture in developing countries, are the primary topic of this review. To understand them, we need first to appreciate the dimensions of the issue-the size of the EC's role in developing country and world trade in agriculture-and then to look at the way the CAP has operated, operates now, and may operate in the future.
EC Agriculture and Trade with Developing Countries
A significant producer of agricultural products, the EC has become both the largest importer and the largest exporter of these commodities in the world. As an importer, for instance, the EC accounted for about 22 percent of world agricultural imports between 1982 and 1985 (as against Japan's 9 percent) (Commission of the European Communities 1988) ; as an exporter, it increased its market share from 9.6 percent in 1973 to more than 12 percent in 1985 to become the world's largest, surpassing the United States, in 1986 (see table 1 ).
For developing countries, the EC is the principal importer and the second most important exporter (after the United States) of agricultural products. Although EC exports make up an increasing share of developing country agricultural imports (the share rose from 15 percent in 1973 to 18 percent in 1980), the EC's importance as a market for the developing countries has declined over the same period. This decline has come about because EC imports of temperate products have fallen nearly to zero; the increase of exports of tropical products not produced in the EC has been too modest to fill the gap.
The principal developing country exporters to the EC are Argentina, Brazil, C6te d'Ivoire, and Thailand (see table 2); the biggest export is coffee, followed by fruits, vegetables, and nuts; animal feeds; wood; cocoa; vegetable oils; tobacco; and cotton (see table 3 ). Developing countries would like to increase their exports of sugar, beef, vegetable oils (including olive oil), tobacco and its products, fruits (especially citrus), and vegetables but are prevented from doing so by border regulations. Note: EC exports and world exports exclude intra -EC trade. 1975 -EC trade. : average of 1974 -EC trade. , 1975 -EC trade. , and 1976 -EC trade. . 1985 -EC trade. : average of 1984 -EC trade. , 1985 -EC trade. , and 1986 . All data refer to the EC-10 (see the notes to The EC's dominant role in world food markets (illustrated in table 1) means that the CAP has had and will have a significant effect on the world food economy and especially on developing countries.
The Operation of the CAP
To understand the ramifications of the CAP, policymakers and planners concerned with agricultural and export development need some understanding of the policy itself-how it started and how it works. The next two sections sketch the origins and operating mechanisms of the CAP as a preface to the more detailed discussion of its implications for developing country exporters and importers. 
The Origins of the CAP
Six European states (Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957, agreeing to integrate their economies. This economic integration was clearly viewed from the start as merely a step toward the ultimate goal of a politically united Europe. An adequate scheme for integrating the agricultural sectors of the member states was considered a priority for several reasons: (1) it was felt that different agricultural price levels could strongly affect real wages and hence the competitiveness of industries; (2) "it was clear that France, the Netherlands, and Italy would not agree to open their markets to industrial goods if Germany in particular did not admit their agricultural exports" (Tracy 1982, p. 268) ; (3) it was hoped that the European Community could gain in efficiency if the agricultural sectors of the member states were forced to adjust to a pattern based on comparative advantage.
But despite general agreement that agricultural integration was a priority, it took nearly three and a half years of argument to settle the basic principles of a common policy after the treaty was signed. And three more years, from 1962 through 1964, were needed to hammer out a common level of cereal prices. The long-term arrangement for financing the CAP was not worked out until 1966.
That agreement was reached in the face of widely diverging national interests reflects the strong political commitment to a common Europe of all the members and perhaps also the strong personality of the first president of the Commission of the European Communities, Walter Hallstein. When the com- mission submitted the proposal for the unification of cereal prices to the Council of Agricultural Ministers, the council rejected the proposal and asked for a modified version that would more closely match individual national interests. Hallstein resubmitted the original proposal after only half an hour. Arguing for the unification of Europe, he asked the council to accept the proposal unanimously or accept the resignation of the commission. The sense that a common Europe dominated national interests prevailed. Since then, the commission has never again fought national interests in favor of EC interests as convincingly and crucially.
The General Operation of the CAP
The CAP is intended to maintain internal agricultural production, and to do so it employs a complex system of variable levies, restitutions, tariffs, and production quotas that maintain EC domestic prices well above world levels. As a result, EC consumers in most years pay five times the world price for milk powder, four times the world price for butter, two and a half times the world price for white sugar and soft cheese, twice the world price for beef, and one and a half times the world price for grains (Bale and Lutz 1981) .
To prevent EC consumers from moving to lower-cost foreign suppliers, imported goods are sold at a higher "threshold" price, and the extra paid (the import levy) provides revenues for the CAP budget. Similarly, because the price supports have encouraged farmers to produce at a level greater than demand within the EC, the excess must be exported, diverted to inferior uses such as animal feed supplements, or purchased by the government. To be able to find buyers, however, the goods must be sold at less than the producer prices, and the loss on each sale constitutes the export restitution, or subsidy.
This system has redistributed income between producers and consumers, and between countries, according to each country's supply of and demand for the controlled commodities. Thus, although policymakers have succeeded in harmonizing the policy instruments by which the CAP is applied in all member countries, they have been less successful in harmonizing national and sectoral interests with the interests of the EC as a whole.
One stumbling block is the decisionmaking process itself. In principle, the commission acts as a watchdog for EC interests. It submits proposals to the Council of Agricultural Ministers during the annual price review, which may be accepted by a majority vote if none of the member countries declares that essential national interests are at stake, in which case the treaty requires unanimous consent. In practice, unanimity is the rule. Taking this into consideration, the commission is obliged to devise proposals that will be as acceptable as possible to all parties-a procedure inconsistent with wider EC interests, since ministers of agriculture are concerned with the income of the farm sector, sometimes to the exclusion of national, let alone EC, interests. The initial proposal is thus often shaped according to criteria that may not correspond with maximization of EC welfare. As delegate vies with delegate in requesting modifications to the original proposal, EC interests recede still further (Eisenkraemer 1980, p. 59) . In the final decision, the interests of farmers are virtually certain to supersede those of third countries and of EC consumers and taxpayers-none of whom is represented.
The history of the CAP illustrates the need to take account of external factors in making decisions. In the first few years of the policy, when the EC was an importing region for nearly all agdfcultural products, and agricultural prices could be raised without serious effects on the budget, the council found it much easier to reach unanimous decisions. But the surpluses on nearly all EC agricultural markets in recent years have altered the rules of the game. A price increase in the EC, widening the gap between EC and world prices, brings higher export restitutions. The cost to taxpayers of raising agricultural prices to help farmers is consequently more obvious.
In the early years of the CAP, when member countries had to pay into the EC budget the amounts needed to finance the Common Policy, the budget was not a binding constraint on policy decisions in Brussels. But now the commission has its "own resources" and must limit expenditure to available funds. The "own resources" of the EC are composed of revenues from tariffs and levies imposed on imports in the EC, up to 1 percent (1.4 percent from 1986 to 1988) of the harmonized value added tax base of the member countries, and the co-responsibility levy for grains, sugar, and milk. Figure 1 shows the chronic shortfall of finances since 1981. The EC's "own resources" were raised by 26 percent in 1986 by increasing the access to the harmonized value added tax from 1 percent to 1.4 percent. A further 25 percent increase was agreed in 1988. Annual price negotiations will become more and more difficult because of limited funds, a problem further complicated by the differing rates of inflation among member countries and by variations in exchange rates.
Market Organizations
Differences in the mechanism of the common market organizations arise only from the specifics of products and market conditions. In principle, all of the common market organizations follow the same fundamental principles-a "unified market," "Community preference," and "common financial solidarity"-and serve the same objectives: to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress; to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community; to stabilize markets; to ensure the availability of supplies; and to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices (article 39, Treaty of Rome). And an official objective of EC trade policy is to contribute to development of international trade by abolishing barriers to trade in stages and by reducing tariffs (article 110 of the treaty). It is worth investigating the extent to which the various market organizations meet these objectives. GRAIN. Grain is the keystone in EC agricultural production because of the close relation between grain prices and other agricultural prices. Grain is an important input for producing pork, poultry, eggs, beef, and milk. The revenue from these products and from grains accounted for about 65 percent of EC final agricultural production in 1985. And grain competes with other agricultural products for land. So grain prices affect the allocation of land to these products and, therefore, their prices. The market organization for grains, with unified grain prices, was one of the first to be set up, in July 1967.
The market in cereals is characterized by border regulations and by internal market regulations. The main element is the threshold price, which is set for a standard quality. Foreign supply is allowed to enter the EC only at the threshold price. The gap between the threshold price and a given offer price of foreign supply is bridged by levies (for imports) or export restitutions (for exports). Thus the entry or exit price is unaffected by variations in the world market price. Although the general idea of the variable levy or export restitution is quite simple, the system does have some flaws in its application:
* If one supplier dominates imports to the EC, offer prices may be higher than world market prices; for instance, the system may push up the prices of some high-quality cereals. -The complex coefficients needed to make different qualities comparable were specified more than twenty-five years ago and no longer represent the free-market premia paid for higher-quality wheat. * Prices are adjusted seasonally, but they are completely unrelated to the pattern of world market prices and thus provide no incentive to trade or private stockholding. * The annual increases in EC prices have been insufficient to attract private carryover grain stocks. * Ascertaining the actual grain content of traded processed grain products (such as grain-fed livestock) that come under the grain market regulation is difficult because of technical change and price-induced substitution of grain ingredients for nongrain ingredients. The EC also influences internal grain market conditions by direct internal intervention. To guarantee internal prices, a target price (the upper bound of market prices), an intervention price (the lower bound of market prices), and, recently, a buying-in price (as a specified percentage of the intervention price) are set. Intervention agencies buy at this price any quantity of cereals above a well-defined quality.
. Introduced to stabilize domestic markets under rare circumstances, intervention prices became more crucial as the EC cereal market moved into a surplus.
Intervention agencies had to buy huge quantities of cereals that were later exported at a loss to defend the intervention prices.
By the mid-1980s it became evident that the grain policy could no longer be financed. Co-responsibility levies were introduced in 1986, whereby grain traders buying grain from EC grain producers had to pay a special tax of 3 percent. In other words, producer prices were reduced and the EC budget was supplemented by this amount.
MILK. Until 1984, the system for milk and milk products was basically the same as that for grain. An annual threshold price for four milk products is set, and the gap between threshold prices and world market prices is made up by a variable levy or export restitutions. But, since dairy producers are much more protected than grain producers, the milk regime costs more in budgetary terms. Since April 12, 1984, the Council of Agricultural Ministers has operated a milk quota system to limit expenditure and the buildup of unsalable stocks of butter and skim milk powder. The system sets two prices: a high price for a specified quantity and a much lower price for production above the quota. The prices are not set in relation to the world price, but the lower price is currently near the world market price.
Experience with the milk (and sugar) market quota system has turned up some significant problems:
IThe systems are much more expensive than expected because the council has been unable to reduce quotas to the equivalent of internal consumption. Thus export restitutions are still paid. Both EC and national expenditure reached even higher levels in the years after the quota system was adopted, as member states substituted national support measures for the CAP.
-The effect of the quota system is counter to regional specialization, the fundamental EC objective of reallocating production from high-cost to low-cost areas. Based on national and even farm quotas, the system precludes such a reallocation and hence any accompanying gains in efficiency. * Higher prices attract substitutes. Margarine producers gain, and milk imitations become more competitive and capture a larger share of the market.
MEAT. Levies are imposed on imports of sheep, lamb, and mutton. But the levy actually charged on the main products (live animals and fresh, chilled, or frozen meat) is limited to 10 percent of the value as a result of voluntary restraint agreements by exporters to the EC. Border regulations are equivalent on the pig and pork market and on the market for poultry and eggs. They include levies and tariffs. A variable levy makes up for differences between feeding costs for foreign suppliers and EC producers. This requires calculation of costs of production, which vary widely and are potentially biased since the producing industry provides the information.
Border regulations on the beef and veal market include a tariff and, under certain circumstances, a levy. The levy is imposed on imports if the EC import price plus the 16 or 20 percent tariff is below 106 percent of the reference price (a notional target price for various products set by the Council of Agricultural Ministers). For exports of beef and veal, as well as of bovines, export refunds may be paid; the authorities have considerable latitude in fixing the restitution.
'Production of beef and veal in the EC has increased more than domestic consumption over the past fifteen years. The exportable surplus amounted to 6 percent of annual production in 1985-86. This trend is expected to continue and to accelerate if some of the proposed reforms, discussed later, are adopted.
FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. Because of the seasonal nature of production and trade in fruits and vegetables, the regulations covering them are more complex than those for cereals and livestock products.
Imports of fruits and vegetables from non-EC countries are subject to tariffs specific to products, seasons, and countries. The Lome Convention allows most imports from forty-six developing country signatories (the African, Caribbean, and the Pacific Group) to enter duty free, and many Mediterranean countries have negotiated preferential tariff rates. Tariffs are higher during the EC production season; for instance, the tariffs on tomatoes are divided among six time spans and for Morocco (a preferential exporter) range from 4.4 percent from November through April to 18 percent from May 15 through October (see von Alvensleben, Behr, and Jahn 1986 for details).
In addition, reference prices, differentiated by product, season, and quality standards, are set annually by the Council of Agricultural Ministers. Fifteen products are specified, and other vegetables are under consideration for inclusion. In early 1988, for example, quotas for Southern Hemisphere apples were introduced, not because the season coincided with the EC production season but because technology is extending the marketing period for deciduous fruit.
On every market day import prices of products from third countries (net of import duties) are determined at certain markets in the EC, and the importer must pay the difference between the import price and the reference price (called a countervailing charge) if the import price is at least 0.6 ECU per 100 kilograms under the reference price for two consecutive days. Thus the reference price becomes the floor market price, with the countervailing charge becoming prohibitive when import prices remain under the reference price for several days.
Export rebates are available for most products included in the reference price system in order to bridge the gap between the reference price and the world market price. In addition, an intervention system exists for many fruits and vegetables by which authorities must intervene by buying produce at a buying-in price. In the 1980-81 season, about a million tons of fresh fruit and vegetables were withdrawn from the market and destroyed at a cost of approximately $108 million.
For processed fruit and vegetables, import tariffs, levies, and licenses are in effect and export rebates and production subsidies are available. The cost of these is high: about $672 million, for instance, in 1981.
The current fruit and vegetable policy suffers from several shortcomings. First, it seems to have been used more as an instrument of Mediterranean regional policy than as a product policy (von Alvensleben 1981). Second, it encourages the destruction or inferior use of wholesome fruits and vegetables. Third, the extent and the price-supporting effects of the subsidies represent a double implicit tax on consumers. The direct support cost for the fruit and vegetable policy in 1982 was budgeted at $950 million and was expected by independent observers to exceed this by $100 million (von Alvensleben 1982) . Many in the EC consider this price too high for the limited objectives the program achieves.
The Benefits and Cost of the CAP to EC Members Some developing countries envy the CAP's achievement. Food security, a matter of concern before the CAP, is no longer a problem. The EC has become more self sufficient in all important food products (table 4). The integration of national agricultural policies has forged ahead; more than 90 percent of agricultural production is now included in common market organizations. And the not available. EC-6 = the original member countries: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. EC-9 = the EC-6 plus Denmark, Great Britain, and the Republic of Ireland (joined in 1973).
EC-1O = the EC-9 plus Greece (joined in 1985).
EC-12 = the EC-10 plus Portugal and Spain (joined in 1986).
Note: Data for 1978 Data for -79, 1982 Data for -83, 1984 Data for -85, and 1986 EC has received its "own resources" to finance the CAP through funds under its own direct control.
But a second objective of the CAP is the unification of EC agricultural markets, and this is by no means an inevitable outcome of the integration of national agricultural policies. There is some evidence that these markets may be less integrated and agricultural production more distorted today than before the existence of the EC.
First, the initial compromise that led to common prices brought increased protection: because it was easier for countries with low prices to agree on higher prices than vice versa, EC prices were set higher than the average prevailing in the member countries before the agreement. This tended to increase the degree of overall protection while decreasing the uniformity of protection rates across agricultural products. And when new members joined the EC in 1973 EC in , 1985 EC in , and 1986 , their agricultural prices were raised to EC levels, with the average increase about 30 percent. In addition, successive rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in lowering protection in nonagricultural sectors, have increased the relative protection of agriculture.
Second, distortions have grown because linkages between agricultural products have intensified. GATT regulations, which do not allow increased border protection at the EC's discretion, have kept prices for certain imported agricultural products relatively low. These new products (such as tapioca, fishmeal, oilseeds, and corn gluten) are substitute inputs in milk, meat, and egg production-and increasingly so, as feeding technologies and breeds have improved. To compete with these imported feeds, domestic cereal production needs large subsidies.
Cross effects on the demand side may be even more important. A mixture of soybeans and tapioca (cheap imports) is a perfect substitute for barley or maize in feed use. Low import prices, in depressing demand for internal use of feed grain in livestock production, contribute to growing grain surpluses. Similar arguments apply to substitutes for butter and olive oil. Linkages to olive oil may soon become even more important. The EC is the world's main producer of olive oil, and a specific market regime exists for it. But since olive oil competes on the demand side with other vegetable oils and animal fats and oils, high prices for olive oil and low prices for imported oilseeds could result in surplus olive oil.
Third, prices are not harmonized among national agricultural markets. The CAP does set uniform prices, expressed in ECUs, but agricultural prices are not uniform across members of the community because of "green" currency exchange rates for agriculture. For instance, the wholesale price of wheat in January 1988 was £127 a ton in France and £143.40 a ton in Germany; the price of butter was £1,900 a ton in Britain and £2,440 a ton in Germany. The intent of the green exchange rate is to compensate producers from member countries differentially while ensuring that intra-EC trade occurs at a common price despite these different producer prices. A system of Monetary Compen-satory Amounts (MCAs) , approximately equal to the difference between the official and green exchange rate for each country, is administered to pay for these differences. A member country with a strong currency receives a positive MCA, and one with a weak currency a negative MCA, for each unit of agricultural output that it exports. Since exchange rates change daily, a series of complex rules exists. Administering, negotiating, and monitoring the MCAs and their rules are cumbersome, time consuming, and costly. The MCAs are in effect internal customs duties or import subsidies (depending on the country) designed to obviate the need to adjust to market forces. Ostensibly safeguards for price harmony, in reality MCAs have the reverse effect.
Fourth is the divisive problem of the method by which the costs and benefits of the budget are distributed among member states and among products within states. Rates of protection are much higher for products mainly produced in the northern part of the EC-such as cereals, milk, and sugar-than for Mediterranean products, such as fruits and vegetables. The issue stimulates lengthy debate in the decisionmaking councils. Some countries see their contributions as transfer payments to the agricultural sector of other members whose production is often surplus to EC needs. The problem is concentrated in the dairy sector, which has received between 27 and 45 percent of CAP agricultural expenditures, and to a lesser extent in the grains sectors, which receive about 26 percent of the agricultural budget.
In sum, agriculture in the EC is less integrated than it appears. Compromises between diverging producer interests, rather than EC-wide interests, have dominated decisions, to the detriment of the EC's welfare as a whole.
Efforts to integrate are also hampered by the mounting costs of maintaining the system. The budget costs of the CAP are very high: currently 60 to 75 percent of the EC budget, equivalent to 0.4 percent of the EC's gross domestic product, 2.5 percent of its spending on food, and 5.6 percent of the gross value of its agricultural output (Matthews 1985a) . The EC survived the steep increase in expenditures that led to exhaustion of its "own resources" in 1981 (see figure  1) only by introducing revenue-raising instruments such as the co-responsibility levy, delaying support payments, and increasing its "own resources" significantly in 1986 and 1988.
The effects of the CAP on the budget are understandably the prime concern for EC policymakers because first, they are visible and there are competing claims for government funds, and second, countries object to being permanent net financers of the CAP's redistribution of income among its members. (Even lower-income members such as Great Britain can be net contributors to the system [see table 5].) Increased EC spending for agriculture has not substituted for national spending, which has also increased; in 1978, the sum of national expenditures was twice as high as EC expenditures. The pattern continues because of national expenditures on the milk quota system and the land set-aside program, which was instituted in 1989 and is partly financed by the EC and partly by member countries (see Koester 1989 for details of the program). Less visible than the CAP'S effects on the budget-but not less significantare the implications for efficiency and distribution. The effects of the CAP on the allocation of resources and hence on the total income of the EC, on consumption patterns, on the distribution of income among individuals and among member countries, and on the EC's trading partners matter very much, measured against a norm based on free trade at world market prices where resources are valued at their international opportunity cost.
The empirical studies on the costs of the CAP up to 1987, summarized by Demekas (1987) (see table 6 ), all convey the same message: agricultural policy in the EC is inefficient in transferring income from consumers and taxpayers to farmers. To transfer one additional dollar to the farm sector costs consumers and taxpayers $1.20-$2.20. If all the money were given directly as a supplement to their income, it would more than double every (full-time) farmer's income, and that per-farmer expenditure is not only higher than actual farmer income-it even exceeds average income in the nonfarm sectors. Even budget outlays, which are only a part of the total loss of the nonfarm sectors, are already higher than net value added of the farm sector.
Implications of the CAP for Developing Countries
The CAP directly affects individual developing country exporters to the EC through the impact of its protective measures on prices and EC demand for specific agricultural exports. Likewise, food importers get better access to EC food because food availability in the EC is improved. Thus the direct effect of the CAP certainly implies a redirection of trade flows. However, these direct effects would only be of concern for developing countries if there are consequential indirect effects which matter a great deal to developing countries. These indirect effects include (1) depressed world market price level and distorted price ratios on the world market, (2) increased instability on world markets and increased uncertainty mainly for exporting countries, and (3) preferential agreements and the distortions they generate.
Some of the effects (such as preferential trade agreements) are positive for specific products in many developing countries. Others-arising from depressed world market prices and increased instability-are negative, though less visible.
To assess the overall effect of the CAP on individual developing countries, its effect on world markets needs first to be investigated.
The Effect of the CAP on World Agricultural Prices
There are alternative approaches to quantifying the CAP's effect on world market prices, and different approaches lead to different results. The answer to the question, What would world market prices be today if the CAP had been Thomson and Harvey (1981) results are for 1980, but their model used data from 1975 for calibration. c. The transfer ratio is defined as the cost to the economy of increasing farmers' income by one unit; in other words, the sum of columns I and 2 divided by column 3. d. Includes change in net government revenue and profits from storage.
liberal from the very beginning?, prompts quite different conclusions from the response when we ask, How might a liberalization of the CAP today affect world market prices?
The answer to the first question is that the protection of EC agriculture for more than twenty years has created a positive production climate for the internal agricultural sector. Resources have flowed into the sector, and the rate of induced technical change was enhanced. Higher prices increased the demand for new technologies and have led to more intensive agricultural research. Hence protectionism is partly responsible for the growth of production in the EC. EC agricultural exports would have been lower and EC agricultural imports higher with a less interventionist policy. Thus world market prices are depressed compared to what they might have been without the CAP.
Using the second question-how liberalization of the CAP today would affect world market prices-as the point of reference leads to different inferences. The effect on world market prices would be different because past protection influenced the rate and direction of technological change and thereby altered the structure of the agricultural sector. In the EC the gap in efficiency between efficient and less efficient farms has increased over time. A reduction in the level of agricultural prices would not simply cause a move down the supply curve; it would lead to structural change in the agricultural sector as efficient farmers expanded to absorb the land, machinery, and workers released as the less efficient farmers moved out of agriculture. The result in the long run would be an increase in supply even in some instances in which prices declined.
The hypothesis cannot be tested against EC data because EC agriculture has never experienced such a significant change. But the experience of New Zealand (an industrial country that recently undertook a major liberalization) and of Germany (which instituted smaller changes) may be instructive. In New Zealand, price reductions in real terms ranged from 15 to 63 percent for individual agricultural products from 1984 to 1986. But aggregate agricultural supply still grew, although at different growth rates for individual commodities (Koester 1988) . The structural effect-the increase in efficiency-apparently offset the effect of lower prices. In Germany, real wheat prices declined by 22 percent between fiscal 1980-81 and fiscal 1986-87, and real agricultural prices fell by 15 percent over the same period. But wheat production increased by 27 percent, and total agricultural production (in grain equivalents) increased by 12 percent over the period, despite the introduction of a milk quota system in 1984.
There are some indications that EC agriculture might react similarly. EC agriculture is inefficient (in the economic meaning of the term): the sector could produce more with less labor and capital if less efficient farms were overtaken by more efficient farms. In the long run, however, the sector's production would most likely grow more slowly or even decline, because agricultural land would be used less intensively and more land would be allocated to nonagricultural use. And agricultural research would become less profitable, so that the effect of technical change would become less over time.
The recent experience of New Zealand indicates that the composition of agricultural supply may change rapidly if the overall price level drops and relative prices change. Hence if the CAP is liberalized some short-run effects on world market prices may show up, particularly in those markets in which EC demand on the world market changes owing to adjustment in internal demand.
World market prices for animal feed would be affected the most quickly, and possibly hit hardest, in the short run. Because of high internal grain and livestock prices, the EC imported 37.8 million tons of animal feed in 1984, of which 60 percent originated in developing countries. These imports would fall in response to lower world prices. Short-run losers from this change in the world market price would be the oil cake-exporting countries such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and the main cassava-exporting countries such as Indonesia and Thailand. Gainers in the short run would be the oil cake-importing economies such as the Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Venezuela (Matthews 1985b, p. 21) .
But even the short-run losers could ultimately gain from such an EC policy if they adjusted their policies and output mix to respond to improved access to EC markets. Benefits could even show up in those markets in which world market prices dropped in the first place as a result of changes in the EC's pattern of protection. Currently EC tariffs escalate the more heavily processed the product. For example, the tariff on soybeans is 0 percent, on soymeal 7 percent, on crude soybean oil 10 percent, on refined soybean oil 15 percent, and on margarine 25 percent (Moyes 1988, p. 9) . Liberalization of the CAP would give exporters of animal feed, such as soybeans, an opportunity to export more processed soybean-based products to the EC, given some internal adjustment by the developing country exporters.
Furthermore, the effects of the CAP on developing countries depend on how other countries react to policy change in the EC-especially the other main actor on world agricultural markets, the United States. The relation between United States and EC agricultural policy is illustrated in figure 2 and described in the following.
The United States protects domestic sugar producers by imposing an import quota on sugar. Domestic sugar prices go up, which creates a market for sugar substitutes such as isoglucose and sweetener. Isoglucose production (from maize) yields the by-product corn gluten, a protein-rich animal feed, which, when mixed with a cheap carbohydrate, is a perfect substitute for cereals. The direct effect of these policies on the world market is that prices and trade volumes for sugar and protein feed are depressed. The high grain prices in the EC, combined with low prices for corn gluten, create a market for cassava, to the advantage of developing country exporters. And low feed prices in the EC increase the exportable surplus of grains, further lowering world grain prices, with a positive effect for some developing countries (importers) and negative for others (exporters). In addition, EC production of dairy and livestock products increases, adding to further distortions on world markets. The effects of EC protection on developing countries, then, depend partly on the structure of protection in other countries-above all in the United States. And how a policy shift in the EC might affect individual developing countries depends materially on how each adjusts its internal policies to any resulting change in world market prices. Such a change is unlikely to show up over the first few years, but world market prices will certainly be affected after full adjustment in the EC has taken place. In sum, the net results of a liberalization of CAP are impossible to predict because they will be determined by numerous possible policy reactions of other countries and by the developing countries themselves.
Some Empirical Estimates
The uncertainties just described obviously limit the value of empirical work on the potential effect of changes in the CAP on world market prices. And useful prediction is also hampered because most of the available research has employed partial equilibrium models, which do not allow for full efficient adjustment throughout the economy, whereas the effects described here can clearly be captured only in a general model. With these caveats in mind, the results of estimates (presented in table 7 along with an estimate of change in EC prices) must be regarded as merely indicative of what might happen to world prices after a longer period of adjustment in EC agriculture.
The results of the estimates of world prices differ significantly because of differing assumptions about supply and demand reactions in the EC and its trading partners. Matthews (1985a) underestimates the degree of protection, mainly for cereals, because he uses the EC cost, insurance, and freight price (which includes full insurance, shipping, and delivery charges) as the relevant world market price whereas the free on board price would have been more appropriate since the EC is an exporter of wheat and barley. Anderson and Tyers (1984) , conversely, overestimate the degree of protection for cereals because they assume the EC threshold price is the relevant EC market price, whereas in fact EC market prices are lower than threshold prices because of internal surpluses. The results nevertheless confirm the CAP's depressing effect on world market prices. Sources: Change in world prices : Matthews, 1985a, p. 141; Anderson and Tyers, 1984, p. 374; Koester, 1982, p. 237. Change in EC prices: Buckwell and others, 1982. A liberalization of the CAP would reduce welfare in net food-importing countries and enhance it in net food-exporting countries (see the results derived by Matthews for EC grain trade liberalization shown in table 8).
Effects on welfare arise from changes in benefits to producers and consumers as well as from changes in terms of trade. EC protection of grain is particularly important both because grain is a keystone in EC agricultural production and also, for trading partners and especially for developing countries, because it is the most heavily traded temperate-zone product. Some models of agricultural trade changes in the EC take into account the interdependency between markets. The work of Tyers and Anderson (1988) included seven product groups, and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) model incorporated ten groups, including the nonagricultural sector. Tyers and Anderson estimated a 15 percent increase in world market prices for the aggregate of seven commodities in 1988-90 if the CAP were liberalized. But the results do not allow us to draw conclusions about the effect of a CAP liberalization on the developing countries because the product groups included-(1) wheat, coarse grain, rice, and meat; and (2) dairy products and sugar-are mainly products of which the developing countries are net importers.
The results of the IIASA model indicate that, in aggregate, developing countries might lose from a liberalization of the CAP. Grain prices would rise, consumption would fall, hunger would increase. But the findings are questionable. First, on the evidence of an anomalous aggregate supply response observed in New Zealand, and given the present structure of EC farming, the predicted decline in EC production is not certain. Second, developing countries' agricultural Matthews, 1985a, p. 120. export sectors and the corresponding EC import regime are not adequately covered in the models. Third, the derived effects on hunger are based on the assumption that changes in world market prices will be passed on to the domestic markets, so that hunger may even increase in a country whose income has risen as a result of changes in the terms of trade. Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1985) conclude the opposite: that developing countries would gain from EC liberalization. Their conclusion may partly be the result of the inclusion in their calculations of fruits and vegetables, important exports of developing countries to the EC, which would, they predict, receive a 16.3 percent boost in price.
The available empirical estimates, then, are markedly divided on how developing countries as a whole would be affected by changes in the terms of trade following CAP liberalization. The main shortcomings of the models are: (1) the final stable equilibrium in EC production is not easily modeled and therefore not accurately predictable; (2) the export commodities of developing countries are not analyzed at a sufficient level of disaggregation to provide useful results; (3) the models do not take into account the present negative effects of tariff escalation, an integral part of EC protectionism, on further-processed products; (4) the conclusions are based only on price effects; they do not explicitly take into account the CAP's effect on the stability of world market prices and the increase in uncertainty owing to the operation of the CAP. The last is a significant flaw, since the detrimental effect of instability and increased risk on production may be especially harmful for developing countries.
The CAP and Instability in World Market Prices
Empirical research Lutz 1979) has shown that the CAP has increased instability on world markets because of the priceinsulating policy and inadequate stockpiling within the EC. In ensuring that domestic prices vary only marginally from year to year, the CAP removes the incentive for private traders within the EC to hold carryover stocks. And since domestic prices are completely disconnected from world market prices, and private exporters always receive an export subsidy to make up for the difference between domestic and world market prices, expectations about world market prices are irrelevant for private EC stockholders .
It is likely, too, that the EC's stockpiling behavior has an effect on stockholding in non-EC countries. Uncertainty about future world market prices increases stockholding in the rest of the world, so that, in contributing to greater uncertainty on world markets, the EC has affected stockholding in non-EC countries. The annual EC policy and pricing exercise produces uncertainty because decisions are unpredictable and have a significant effect on world prices. Thus through its policies, the cost of holding stocks larger than would be held if the EC did not insulate its agriculture is thrown onto the rest of the world.
Determinants of Change and Policy Options
The 1980s have seen some changes in the CAP, largely driven by budgetary concerns. Before the 1980s the policy had changed little. This section looks at what may determine future changes and what form and direction they are likely to take.
The Impetus for Change
Several potential motivations for change exist. The objectives of policymakers may change for two reasons. First is that environmental effects are becoming more important in decisionmaking. Those often called Greens advocate a policy that leads to less intensity of production, fewer so-called agricultural factories (which should be taxed), and more family-owned farms (which should be subsidized). Large-scale production of livestock would be forbidden, and land subsidies would be given as compensation for farming activities that enhance the environment. Second is a shift in perception of the goal for agricultural income. In the 1950s and 1960s, policymakers aimed at parity of per capita income in agriculture with income outside agriculture, an objective that turned out to be unattainable. The goal now is relative parity: the change in agricultural income should be the same as the change in nonagricultural income.
Financial constraints have changed. In every EC country, budget pressures are a driving force for policy change. The commission's access to financial resources increased significantly in 1986 and 1988, but further increases beyond the present agreed ceiling are unlikely to be feasible politically. This constraint holds for the commission budget but not for policy measures financed directly by individual member countries, an important qualification discussed in the following.
International commitments are a pressure for change. Article 16 of the GATT in particular constrains the CAP. This article permits subsidies on exports of primary products only if these do not bring the country concerned a more than equitable share in world trade in that product. To avoid breaking this rule, the EC will have to take specific measures to manage domestic markets. Prices may have to be reduced to curtail production growth arising from technological change if domestic demand does not expand sufficiently. This constraint may be binding.
Changes may occur in the decisionmaking process itself. The specifics of the decisionmaking process in the EC may be a principal determinant of the way the CAP will go (see Petit 1985) . The unanimity rule has meant that changes in the CAP may arise because they are in the interest of an individual country rather than of the EC as a whole. As the number of members has increased, the divergence of interests has increased. This, in fact, along with the recent acceptance of majority rule by the Council of Agricultural Ministers, has strengthened the influence of the commission. Even so, given the binding budget constraint, if individual members find majority decisions unacceptable from their national point of view, the tendency to nationalize agricultural policies will continue.
Policy instruments are becoming less effective and less appropriate. This is especially true of price supports, as the main instrument of agricultural income policy, and of variable levies, as the main border measure. Price support policy has become less effective because (1) the enlargement of the EC from six to twelve members has made European agriculture more heterogeneous-it is harder to achieve the same agricultural income target in all EC countries; and (2) EC agriculture now relies more on purchased inputs and rented land, so that more of the benefits of price support are going to inputs and less to farm operators than in earlier years.
Policy Options: Prospects and Possibilities
Some authors, however, see little prospect for fundamental change. They argue that "despite all the comment, all the criticism, all the ideas on reform, the policy is fundamentally unaltered" (Fennell 1987, p. 62) . This is true in many respects, but there have been some straws in the wind of change: in 1984 support prices were lowered for the first time (by 0.5 percent); since then, support prices have been lowered in three years, by 0.3 percent (1986), 0.2 percent (1987), and 0.1 percent (1988) The financial crisis of the CAP has saved expenditure at the EC level but switched the spending to national budgets. The spending of countries such as Germany has increased steeply since 1984. Likewise, the acreage set-aside program, in shifting expenditure from the EC to national budgets, will encourage the tendency toward uncontrolled nationalization of agricultural policies in the EC (Koester 1981) .
The CAP, in its present form, must change as experience with fine-tuning the policy demonstrates that its costs, in their totality, cannot be contained. One direction for change-a move toward opening agriculture to world market forces-is attractive to many economists but finds few supporters elsewhere. Not only farmers but also countries that may lose by the redistribution of costs and benefits oppose such a reform. The most recent experience suggests that the set of policy instruments may be expanded. The steps in this direction have a common feature: they have strong effects on distribution and efficiency. For example, the quota system adopted to reduce the milk surplus cut production on small farms by less than that on large farms, and the cereal levy does not apply to small producers and those in less advantaged areas. Consequently, operators of small farms with a substantial nonfarm income receive propor-tionately greater benefits. These policies retard structural change and discriminate against larger farms-further attenuating the efficiency objective of the CAP and the competitiveness of European agriculture.
The expanded set of policy instruments is a further impetus to renationalization of agricultural policies. The richer countries with smaller agricultural populations can afford to pay more to farmers than poor countries with large agricultural populations. The cost of a national agricultural support program to an individual country is less than the cost to the EC of disposing of the surplus that such programs generate. Thus individual EC countries can support their farmers and create surpluses, whose cost of disposition is shared by all EC members. Not only will increased national programs require a higher EC budget, but they will affect the willingness of countries to finance the EC budget. Radical change in the CAP will be needed to forestall its collapse if present policies continue.
All of the numerous proposals for reforming the CAP have a common element: the substitution of direct transfers for price support. The rationale for this proposed solution is that divorcing farm production decisions from the level of income support aims the policy directly at the target (that is, adequate agricultural supply and income) while eliminating, among other things, indirect distortions of price supports. So far such solutions have been rejected by farmers and policymakers, largely because direct transfers of income make so transparent the costs to taxpayers and consumers. Taxpayers might, on becoming aware of the size of the transfer, demand tighter limits on the quantity transferred.
Yet with countries outside the EC also opposing the CAP in its present form, and the emphasis given to agriculture during the current round of GATT negotiations, there is a chance that changes will occur-although the changes are most likely to be marginal ones that respond to specific concerns but do little to address the structural problem. For economists observing the evolution and cost of the CAP it is remarkable that such large annual expenditures can be made without any corresponding structural adjustment in agriculture being required as part of the support. It is important for developing countries as a group to present at the forthcoming trade talks a well-reasoned proposal for reform of the CAP that offers them increased access to the EC market. This is no small task, for two reasons. First, arguments based on worldwide efficiency and economics have swayed EC policymakers little in the past-though this may be changing as the detrimental effects of CAP on world agriculture and on EC welfare are becoming more widely understood within the EC. And second, disparate interests within developing countries prevent them from presenting a unified position. For example, the North African countries with preferential access to the EC for fruit and vegetables would presumably be reluctant to see that preference generalized to all developing countries.
But even with the prospect of change in the CAP, developing countries are well advised to be cautious when formulating development plans and when investing in agriculture. It is not realistic to assume that output destined to be exported to the EC will have unlimited access or even the same access it now enjoys. However desirable that outcome, it is likely to be a long time in coming. In the meantime it is incumbent upon policymakers and negotiators in developing countries to understand as fully as possible the operation of and motivation behind the CAP so that they can argue their case in an informed way in international and bilateral fora. The current GATT round will provide an occasion not only for them to use their knowledge and skills but also for EC policymakers to view EC agriculture in the larger global context. Perhaps with these two influences, more fundamental changes in the CAP are possible.
